Howe's Costly Error

On 10 April 1777, Richard Henry Lee, in Philadelphia, wrote a letter to General Washington on his thoughts for the upcoming campaign:

“I think they [the British] cannot purpose coming here, because the water securities ageinst such a plan are realy formidable, and the situation of the land, where the water obstructions are fixed, is such, that great delay, and probable ruin forbids the enterprize, as they cannot so fix land Batteries as to remove the strong Vessels that protect the Cheveaux de Frise, added to the numerous fire rafts & Fire Ships that in a narrow water with strong current may destroy their Fleet. Your Army Sir feeble as it is, and the North river, are more tempting Objects, because they are not strong, and because the defeat of the one, or the acquisition of the other, would avail our enemies greatly” (1).

At this point of the season, the British in New York were beginning to stir. Washington maneuvered his men into position so that they would be prepared for a British attack up the Hudson or on Philadelphia. General William Howe’s plan for the campaign was to take Philadelphia and then support Burgoyne’s thrust from Canada once he reached Albany. In Howe’s mind, his plan matched perfectly with the goals of the British Ministry. Lord George Germain agreed with the plan, if only Howe can close his Philadelphia operations in time to assist the expedition from Canada (2). Washington was made aware of these potential plans. Richard Henry Lee, at the Congress in Philadelphia, had received a letter from Arthur Lee, who wrote from Bordeaux, France on 20 February 1777. R.H. Lee forwarded part of the letter to Washington on 29 April. It read, in part: “Boston is certainly to be attacked in the Spring. Burgoyne is to command. Howe will probably turn against Philadelphia. The Government expects great advantages from dissentions in Pennsylvania” (3).

Howe decided to take his army by sea to avoid attacks on his flanks through New Jersey, to lessen desertions from his army, and to avoid preserving the long communication lines from Philadelphia, across the Delaware River, through New Jersey to New York City. Howe attempted a number of smaller drives into New Jersey, hoping to bring Washington’s army down from his fortified position for a decisive engagement. Though Howe almost succeeded in late June, a month of the campaign had been wasted (4). In fact, more than a month had been wasted. The Americans were expecting the British to move in April, in May the latest.

After 47 days aboard ships, the British army finally landed at Head of Elk on 25 August. By this time, Burgoyne had already retaken Fort Ticonderoga, but had suffered a large loss of men at Bennington. The British, on their march to Philadelphia, were harassed by the Americans, but it was not until they reached Brandywine Creek that a battle occurred. Despite victory at Brandywine, Howe still needed to gain control of the Delaware River in order to supply the city of Philadelphia. Howe still made no move to send reinforcements to Burgoyne. Burgoyne, instead of temporarily halting his campaign to await word from Howe, continued. After the British took Philadelphia, Washington attempted to dislodge them, resulting in the Battle of Germantown on 4 October. Only days later, Burgoyne was forced to surrender his entire army to the Americans under General Horatio Gates at Saratoga.

No longer needing to send any men up the Hudson, Howe had to take control of the Delaware. A series of forts and chevaux-de-frise blocked their path. It was not until mid-November that the Americans abandoned Fort Mifflin, effectively giving the British command of the river.

With the surrender of nearly 6,000 men at Saratoga, along with arms and accoutrements, the British garrisons at Ticonderoga and Crown Point retreated to Canada. By the end of the year, the British occupied only New York, Philadelphia and Rhode Island (5). Furthermore, the French were impressed enough to openly declare for the Americans – a treaty of alliance was signed on 6 February 1778. Spain and Holland also backed the Americans.

Howe’s failure to follow through on the strategic plans for 1777 probably cost Great Britain her American colonies. Victory along the Hudson would have allowed the British to separate the New England colonies from the rest, as had been proposed the year before. Instead, the British would not only have to re-conquer her American colonies, but they were now propelled into a world war by Howe’s decisions in taking Philadelphia.

Notes

(1) Chase, 118.

(2) Mackesy, 122-3.

(3) Chase, 301.

(4) Mackesy, 125.

(5) Wood, 171.

Bibliography

Chase, Philadner D., ed. The Papers of George Washington, March - June 1777. Vol. 9. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1999.

Mackesy, Piers. The War for America 1775-1783. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Wood, W.J. Battles of the Revolutionary War, 1775-1781. Chapel Hill: Da Capo Press, 2003.

The War Begins (1775-1776): An Overview

During the time leading up to the events of 19 April 1775, both the Americans and the British were preparing for war, but neither side was prepared for war. Militia companies throughout the colonies (and especially in Massachusetts) were training and stockpiling supplies. There was no cohesion, however, on a multi-colony force, and the discipline needed for an effective fighting force was not to be found. The British, for their part, sent more soldiers to the colonies, but they did not send enough. Despite warnings from General Thomas Gage in Massachusetts, the British government was still slow to respond to what Gage though necessary to quell the rebellion. The British for the most part, though, were smug and overconfident, and, during 1775-6, they sometimes underestimated the Americans.

After the British were forced back to Boston from Concord in devastating fashion by the guerilla tactics used by the Americans, there was little change in British thinking. The British army was a well-trained, well-disciplined fighting force in open-field battle. The Americans, however, were not as reliable in that setting, though they were usually effective behind walls, in houses and among the woods. On 17 June 1775, a combination of these factors turned into disaster for the British. They attempted to take a fortified American position on Breed’s/Bunker Hill in Boston, but no effort was made to prepare for retreat, and the British did not even bring a reserve force onto the field. The Americans retreated only after they ran out of powder.

The British wanted, and thought they could have, a quick end to the war. A prolonged war favored the Americans. The Americans could replace their losses more easily; even small American victories (or British setbacks) were huge in the American and British psyche; and the Americans could always retreat and regroup in the seemingly endless wilderness of the country forever. The British had their work cut out for them. Along with the aforementioned American advantages, the British were also at a disadvantage in the facts that not only did they have to re-occupy every colony to re-establish themselves, but they also had the added worry that a protracted war would bring other European powers into the fray.

After Bunker Hill, in late 1775, the Americans made an attempt to take Canada, which failed. By early March 1776, however, George Washington and his rag-tag mix of soldiers had forced the British from Boston, mostly on the backs of Henry Knox and his men. Howe briefly retreated to Halifax, Nova Scotia.

The overall British strategy remained the same – bring the Americans back into the fold. Conversely, the details of how to do this differed depending on who was asked. Politics in Parliament and amongst the generals played a major role in the British strategy. While many in England wanted to make the Americans feel the strength of Britain’s full military might, some also wanted to subdue the Americans via economic consequences. The Howe brothers – General Sir William Howe and Admiral Richard Howe – were sympathetic to the American cause. They wanted the colonies under the British umbrella, but they did not want to force it upon them with a devastating war. Howe reminded those who would listen to “treat our enemies as if they might one day become our friends” (Mackesy, 34). It would seem that he would avoid acting in any matter that might be too destructive to the Americans in the early going.

Howe’s early strategy was to use New York City as the British base of operations. From here, Howe planned to isolate the New England colonies by advancing up the Hudson River and uniting with Sir Guy Carleton’s force there. After subduing the hotbed of revolution in New England, Howe would contend with the other colonies (Mackesy, 60). After a failed attempt to subdue South Carolina, General Henry Clinton returned to New York and joined with Howe. The Battle for New York began horribly for the Americans. After the Declaration of Independence was signed, Howe landed his force on Long Island in August. A follow-up to the devastating defeat on Long Island was only slowed by Howe’s general cautiousness, and his hope for peace without further war. In fact, from the time of Washington’s retreat on 29 August 1776 until 15 September, Howe’s army made no moves (Mackesy, 89). An attempt at peace was made on 11 September, when Howe met with some prominent American Congressmen on Staten Island. Howe offered only pardons, while the Americans were looking for promises of independence, and nothing was accomplished.

Washington retreated from New York City ahead of the British advance and moved to Harlem Heights and then White Plains. His strategy now was to “on all occasions avoid a general action” (Mackesy, 91). Still Washington, or at least his generals, believed that Forts Washington and Lee could hold strong against whatever the British could throw at them. Unfortunately for Washington, he listened to his generals, who proved to be very wrong. Fort Washington, which the Americans believed could hold out virtually indefinitely against a British assault, was overpowered by a combined British and Hessian force in one afternoon. Those of the American defending force who were killed surrendered to the British to the tune of over 2,600 men (Carrington, 254). Days later, the Americans retreated from Fort Lee without a fight – and without most of their supplies and stores. The loss of these valuable men and accoutrements sent Washington’s army scurrying just ahead of the British advance, clear across New Jersey and into Pennsylvania.

While Howe’s men were pacifying New Jersey, Clinton was sent to Rhode Island, where he took Newport with little resistance. Howe was happy with the results of the campaign, and established his winter quarters in lines across New Jersey. Washington was camped with his men on the Pennsylvania side of the Delaware River. He also had posts along the Hudson River in New York. Howe’s plan for the next campaign at the start of December called for a push up the Hudson River. After his unforeseen success, and his closeness to the city, he changed his goal to first capture the Philadelphia, this even despite Washington’s surprise attack and victory at Trenton to close 1776 (and his subsequent successes in the state of New Jersey).

As a final note, the British planned to blockade the American coast, to squeeze the American economy. The Howe brothers were not provided enough ships for this goal, but even more than that, two other factors were involved in the failure of bringing the American economy to its knees. First, not all of the British (including the Howe brothers) were one hundred percent on board with this plan. More importantly, despite the fact that the Americans had barely a navy to speak of, they did have many smaller and faster privateers. These ships were not only able to avoid the larger and slower British ships to deliver goods to the Americans, but some of them were also outfitted for offensive actions. Some of these ships, with the promises of riches, harasses and captured British shipping. The privateers were more than annoying pests, as they were sometimes lucky enough to capture ships containing arms or other necessities, and they continued to act throughout the war to the detriment of the British war effort.

Bibliography

Carrington, Henry B. 1974. Battles of the American Revolution 1775-1781. New York: Promontory Press.

Mackesy, Piers. 1964. The War for America 1775-1783. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Battle of Bunker Hill

After the American colonists had chased the British soldiers from Concord back to Boston on 19 April 1775, the militia formed a line across the narrow neck of land that connected the peninsula that was the city of Boston to the surrounding countryside. The British were stuck in the town and could only be relieved by sea or by breaking through the American lines. A short glance at a map shows two other peninsulas surrounding Boston in the harbor. To the south lies Dorchester Heights. The neck of land leading to this area was many times wider than that leading into Boston, but the Heights had a commanding view of the city. To the north of Boston is the Charlestown Peninsula. Besides the small settlement of Charlestown, directly across the harbor from Boston, there are a series of hills, the highest being Bunker Hill. To get to this peninsula by land, a width of ground about the size of that leading to Boston had to be crossed.

map from sonofthesouth.net

The Americans were ordered by General Artemas Ward to occupy Bunker Hill on the night of 16-17 June 1775 after receiving intelligence that the British would attempt to do so the following evening. After a meeting between some of the American commanders, it was decided to fortify Breed’s Hill first, and Bunker Hill if time permitted. The reasoning behind the decision lay in the fact that Breed’s Hill lay closer to Boston and could prevent a buffer if the British launched an attack from across the harbor.

In the morning, Charlestown was fired upon by British ships in the harbor. The Americans by this time had been working all night; they were short on all supplies – food, water and ammunition included. They were also short on sleep, and they were aware that an attack by the British must be short in coming. By afternoon no less than four British ships, bearing about forty guns, were firing from the harbor onto American positions. Colonel William Prescott, commanding the American forces, watched Sir William Howe maneuver his forces into position, and reacted by moving his men into a better defensive position. From his post on the hill, Prescott could observe almost every move made by the redcoats and make an appropriate response.

Howe lined up his men ready to attack with the bayonet in three charges. Two errors were made in the process. The British artillery was supplied with the wrong caliber balls, making them of little service and Howe was unaware of the some of the American positions. Most importantly, Howe did not know of Stark’s men on the beach where the British would make their initial charge. [1] The resulting British offensive was disastrous. American fire cut down the British and stopped their advance each time, resulting in the British leaving 96 dead on the field. [2]

map from sonofthesouth.net

The following British advancing lines had difficulty on the approach to the American position at the rail fence because of the terrain and other obstructions. While the British fire mostly went over the heads of the Americans, the colonists fired at wave after wave of the redcoats with deadly results. After a number of charges and many men left lying on the field, the British retreated to regroup for another attack.

The next British attack was directed at the American force on Breed’s Hill. Again, the British, firing from seventy to eighty yards away, shot over the American positions. The Americans, waiting until the redcoats got closer, hit their marks, forcing another British retreat. This time, however, Howe had a more orderly retreat and was able to reform his men for a new attack. The second attack was also beaten back. Howe, now with General Henry Clinton and Robert Pigot, prepared for a three-pronged attack on Breed’s Hill, with a holding fire on Stark’s men at the rail fence. This time, with British fire seemingly surrounding the Americans, including artillery firing grapeshot, the Americans were forced to retreat as the British stormed the redoubt. The Americans had their greatest losses during the retreat. [3] The American forces stormed past the neck of Charlestown peninsula in their retreat, where they would build entrenchments overnight, but the British had command of both Breed’s and Bunker Hill.

Either side could lay claim to victory in the Battle of Bunker Hill. The Americans inflicted more casualties, but the British won the ground.* General Clinton summed up the battle: “A dear bought victory, another such would have ruined us.” [4] The battle would have an effect on the fighting in the New York-New Jersey campaign of 1776. Howe moved cautiously, with Bunker Hill always in mind, and General Nathaniel Greene was convinced that the Americans could hold Fort Washington indefinitely against a British attack using the defense at Bunker Hill as his reasoning.

* Casualty counts, as in most battles of the war, are hard to nail down. It is generally agreed that although the Americans had about 3,000 men on Charlestown peninsula, only about 1,400-1,500 were ever engaged in battle. Most accounts have the number of American casualties between 440-450 killed, wounded and captured. Similar discrepancies exist among British numbers. A number of historians agree on the British force numbering about 2,500 men, although at least one has them with over 3,000 men fighting. British casualties were about 1,150. Besides Wood, Carrington’s Battles of the American Revolution and Savas and Dameron’s A Guide to the Battles of the American Revolution were consulted for obtaining these casualty numbers.

[1] Wood, W.J. Battles of the Revolutionary War, 1775-1781. Chapel Hill: Da Capo Press, 2003, p. 19-20.

[2] Ibid, p. 22.

[3] Ibid, p. 31

[4] Moran, Donald N. "The Battle of Bunker Hill." Revolutionary War Archives. March 1985. http://www.revolutionarywararchives.org/battles-link/49-the-battle-of-bunker-hill (accessed January 16, 2011).

A Duel

Button Gwinnett was born in England in 1732. There he became a merchant. He emigrated to Charleston, South Carolina in the year 1770. Within a couple of years, Gwinnett moved to Georgia, where he was swept up among the patriots, and was elected a delegate to the Continental Congress meeting in Philadelphia. There, in 1776, he voted for independence from Great Britain, affixing his name to the Declaration of Independence. Gwinnett left Congress in 1777 in order to join the Georgia Convention to write a constitution for that state. He was shortly thereafter voted as President of the Council, which was the highest office in the state. Not simply content with this position, Gwinett attempted to acquire the position of Brigadier General. [1]




Lachlan McIntosh was born in 1727 in Scotland, and arrived in the American colonies at the age of eight years. He was active on the patriot side in the years leading up to the Revolutionary War, and he obtained the rank of colonel in time to assist in repelling the British from Savannah in 1776. [2] His skills and popularity allowed him to defeat Gwinnett and become a brigadier general in the Continental Army.

Soon after this defeat, Gwinnett, in an attempt to usurp power from McIntosh, proposed that the Georgia militia attack a British post in eastern Florida. The expedition resulted in defeat for the Georgians, possibly due to a lack of assistance from McIntosh. After an inquiry into the failed attempt exonerated Gwinnett of any misconduct, McIntosh denounced Gwinnett in harsh terms. McIntosh said of Gwinnett, among other things, that he was "a Scoundrell & lying Rascal." [3] Gwinnett demanded an apology, which was promptly denied to him. Gwinnett, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, challenged McIntosh, a Brigadier General, to a duel.


The two combatants met outside of Savannah, Georgia on land belonging to former royal governor James Wright on the morning of 16 May 1777. The men examined their pistols and took their stand. Gwinnett and McIntosh exchanged fire at close range. Both men were wounded in the thigh. McIntosh asked Gwinnett if he had received his satisfaction, and the men shook hands, ending the duel. [4] Gwinnett's wound, however, proved to be fatal. He died three days later, 19 May 1777. Gwinnett was buried in Colonial Park Cemetery in Savannah, Georgia.


McIntosh survived the duel, as well as the ensuing trial. He was, however, removed from Georgia at the request of George Walton, another Georgia politician and signer of the Declaration of Independence. Walton wrote to George Washington in August 1777 that he was "afraid the friends of the deceased, made sore by the loss of their principal, would again blow up the embers of party & dissention, and disturb the harmony & vigour of the Civil & military authorities." [5] In consequence, McIntosh spent the winter of 1778 at the Valley Forge camp before leading a successful expedition against the Indians in the Ohio River Valley. McIntosh returned to Georgia in 1779. He participated in the failed defense of Savannah in that year, and was captured in Charleston, South Carolina in 1780. He was relieved of his duty by the Continental Congress, though not dishonorably, and served in that body in 1784. [6] McIntosh died in Savannah in 1806 and is also buried in Colonial Park Cemetery.





As a final note, Gwinnett's signature is a rarity because of his untimely death so soon after the signing of the Declaration of Independence. It is considered the most valuable of all the signatures of the 56 men who signed the document. In 1979 a letter signed by Gwinnett sold for $100,000 at auction in New York. (This was the last time a document with Gwinnett's signature was for sale at auction.) [7]



Notes:

[1] Lossing, Benjamin J. Lives of the Signers of the Declaration of Independence. Aledo, TX: Wallbuilders, Inc., 1998. (Reprinted from the 1848 original), p. 227-8.
[2] Sullivan, Buddy. "Lachlan McIntosh," New Georgia Encyclopedia. 12 September 2002. http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-671> Accessed 6 March 2011.
[3] The Papers of George Washington June – August 1777, Revolutionary War Series, Volume 10. ed. Frank E. Grizzard, Jr.. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000, p. 514.
[4] "Historic Duel Recalled," New York Times. 10 April 1914. http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9F06E1D91E39E633A25753C1A9629C946596D6CF>. Accessed 6 March 2011.
[5] The Papers of George Washington..., p. 513.
[6] Sullivan, Buddy.
[7] Deaton, Stan. "Button Gwinnett," New Georgia Encyclopedia. 9 February 2009. http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-2543&hl=y> Accessed 6 March 2011.

January 27th

On 27 January 1777, the British and Hessians, under General Alexander Leslie and Colonel Carl Emilius von Donop ventured into New Jersey on a foraging expedition. The force, numbering two hundred men of the light infantry, four hundred men of the English regiments, the Grenadier Battalion Linsing, fifty horse and Capt. Johann Ewald with fifty Jaegers, marched toward Samptown (present-day South Plainfield). Near Quibbletown (present-day Piscataway), the Americans attacked the party several times, but could not prevent the enemy from foraging. Captain Ewald claimed "a few men were killed and wounded on both sides." (1)

(1) Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal. Capt. Johann Ewald, Trans. & ed. Joseph P. Trustin, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1979, p. 52.

The Battle of Paulus Hook, 19 August 1779

An American force under General Anthony Wayne surprised the fortified British post at Stony Point, New York on the night of 15-16 July 1779. With minimal losses, Wayne’s force took over 500 British prisoners in less than twenty-five minutes. Inspired by this attack, Major Henry Lee proposed to General Washington his own surprise attack.

"Light Horse Harry Lee" by Charles Willson Peale, 1782.

Lee, alternately known as Light Horse Harry, came from a distinguished Virginia family. His great-great grandfather, Richard Lee, left England for Jamestown in 1639. He later rose to the office of Attorney General of the colony of Virginia. His son, Henry’s great-grandfather, Richard Lee II, was a member of the House of Burgesses in Virginia. His son, and Henry’s grandfather, was Henry Lee, was a wealthy landowner in Virginia. (His wife was related to Thomas Jefferson and English royalty. His brother served as Governor of the Virginia colony.) Henry Lee’s son, Henry Lee II, was Light Horse Harry’s father. He served in a number of political offices both before and after the Revolution. Other relations also had a hand in the Revolution. His third cousin was Richard Henry Lee, the Continental Congressman who offered the resolution for the Declaration of Independence, which he later signed. The distinguished line continued after Henry Lee III. His son was Confederate General Robert E. Lee (who married into George and Martha Washington’s family). Henry Lee III – Light Horse Harry – was born in 1756, and was a cavalry officer in the Revolutionary Army. After the war, Lee served as Governor of Virginia, and served in Congress.

The fort is at the lower section of the picture.

The causeway and the ditch are also sketched.

For most of the war, the British held a fort across the river from New York City at Paulus Hook (alternately spelled as Powles Hook, Paulus Hoeck and Paulis Hook). Paulus Hook is today located within the boundaries of Jersey City. The borders correspond roughly to Harsimus Cove (near Newport Centre Mall) on the north, the Hudson River on the east, Communipaw Cove (present-day Liberty State Park) on the south and a large salt marsh on the west. In the marsh, which was several hundred feet in width, the British cut a ditch about twenty feet wide. Over this ditch they built a drawbridge and a gate, protecting the only landward entrance to the fort. Breastworks and an abatis (see photo below) surrounded the fort. Inside the breastworks were three blockhouses, and inside the fort’s walls was the magazine. (1) It was this secure post that Light Horse Harry received permission to attack.

An example of an abatis. This one is located in Yorktown, VA.

Major Lee was headquartered about two miles from the Paramus Church on the road to New York when he took up his line of march at about half past ten on the morning of 18 August 1779. With him were with two companies of Maryland troops under Captain Levin Handy. These were met by about 300 Virginians under Major Jonathan Clark and a number of dismounted dragoons under Captain Allan McLane of Delaware at the New Bridge. The soldiers, numbering around four hundred, marched out of New Bridge with Captain Handy in the advance around four in the afternoon, intending to reach the fort on Paulus Hook at low tide (to make crossing the swamp and ditch easier), which was just after midnight. (2) Before leaving, Lee procured some empty wagons, to give the look of a foraging expedition, and detached Captain Henry Peyton with a small number of men to go to Newark to obtain boats and bring them to Douw’s ferry, where they would wait to ferry Lee’s troops after the assault. (3) With his plan in place and the march begun, Lee received some assistance from the British in the garrison of the Paulus Hook fort.

The troops in the garrison at Paulus Hook were the 4^th Battalion of Skinner’s Provincial Brigade, under the command of Colonel Abraham van Buskirk, and a part of the Invalid Battalion. Major William Sutherland of the Invalid Battalion was the commander. It had been determined earlier that Colonel van Buskirk would take a detachment from the fort on the evening of 18 August to attempt to surprise a party of about 100 Americans near the English Neighborhood. To replace van Buskirk’s men, Sutherland requested reinforcements, which were granted – a Captain and forty men from the Knyphausen Regiment were sent to the fort. (4) The total force at the garrison, after van Buskirk left with his 130 or so men and the reinforcements arrived, was about 200 men, including Skinner’s 2^nd Battalion, sixty invalids, and Captain Henrich Sebastian von Schaller with forty men from the Hessian Regiment Erb Prinz. The Americans under Lee were not aware that the Tories had left the fort and were replaced by the seasoned Hessians. (5)

Lee’s columns on the march consisted of a detachment of one hundred men from Woodford’s brigade under command of Major Clark on the right; the Marylanders under Captain Handy formed the center; Major Lee took to the left with a detachment of one hundred men for Muhlenberg’s brigade and Captain McLane’s dragoons. The forlorn* on the right was led by Lieutenant Vanderville of the 1^st Virginia Regiment; the center by Lieutenant Reed of the 5^th Maryland; and the left by Lieutenant Armstrong of the dragoons. The remaining troops commanded by Captain Reed of the 10^th Virginia were to form the reserve. Lee hoped to launch all three attacks on the fort at the same time. (6)

In Lee’s report to General Washington on 22 August, he wrote “My anxiety to render the march as easy as possible, induced me to pursue the Bergen road lower than intended. After filing into the mountains, the timidity or treachery of the principal guide prolonged a short march into a march of three hours; by this means the troops were exceedingly harassed, and being obliged, through deep mountainous woods, to regain our route, some parties of the rear were unfortunately separated.” It is of some speculation that the separated party of about 200 Virginians may have purposefully left the expedition, possibly out of jealousy of Lee. Whatever the reason, Lee was left with about 150 men for the attack on the fort. (7) He had to re-plan his attack on the spot.

Just after midnight on the 19^th, as Colonel van Buskirk was chasing retreating Americans towards New Bridge, Lee’s remaining men were approaching the fort at Paulus Hook. Lieutenant Michael Rudolph and Lieutenant McAllister led the forlorn soldiers two miles through the swamp. They arrived near the ditch at three o’clock, as the tide was approaching. They luckily went undiscovered by the sentries, who initially thought the sound of the approaching troops was that of van Buskirk’s men returning. Lee quickly formed his men in three columns, and they advanced upon the fort in silence. After Lee’s repositioning of his depleted force, the column to the right was under Major Clark, with McAllister leading the forlorn; the center column was headed by Captain Forsyth with Randolph leading the forlorns; and the left column, under Captain Handy was to move to the front, but act as a reserve. (8)

The British garrison was not alerted until the heard the Americans, led by Clark and McAllister, splashing through the ditch. Although the British quickly opened fire once they realized their mistake, the forlorns had already torn through the abatis and charged into the redoubt. McLane and Forsyth quickly broke through on their side and captured a blockhouse with officers and men inside. McAllister tore down the British colors. Lieutenant Armstrong captured the blockhouse on the right with its officers and men. The British artillery pieces were quickly seized, so that the distress signal could not be given to the force across the river in New York. Major Sutherland and Captain Schaller, with the Hessians, barricaded themselves in a blockhouse and kept up a steady fire on the Americans. Lee attempted to set fire to the barracks, but realized that they housed a number of sick soldiers, women and children he left them standing. (9)

Major General James Pattison later wrote that he originally concluded that since the alarm guns had not sounded, he thought“Buskirk was on his Return, and that some small Party had been harassing his Rear, the Firing at that Time having nearly ceas’d.” He learned otherwise after a messenger returned with news from Major Sutherland stating that “the Enemy having got thro’ the Abbatis, had taken the right hand & center Block-houses and the Principal Fort, but that the Round Redoubt, in which was himself with a Captain & 25 Hessians, had been defended, that the left Block house was likewise safe & that the Enemy had retreated, carrying off with them the Guards of the two Block houses.” (10)

By four o’clock, with daylight coming on and aware that the New York garrison had been alerted, Lee began his retreat, although he was unable to destroy the magazine or spike the guns. The attack had been partially successful, especially considering the odds. Lee’s force suffered two killed and three wounded, but had killed or wounded fifty of the defenders and took 158 prisoners. Pattison later reported by the returns he had received, “there were Killed 4 Serjts, 2 Corpls, & 3 Privates, Wounded 2 Serjeants & taken or missing 4 Subalterns, 7 Serjts, 5 Corpls, & 97 Privates.” Leading the way Major Clark, in charge of most of the prisoners, retreated across the causeway, followed by Captain Handy. Lieutenants Armstrong and Reed brought up the rear. When the men approached the location where Captain Peyton should have been waiting with the boats, he found nothing. Since no reports had been received by Peyton, and daylight had approached, he thought the attack had been called off, and retreated with the boats to Newark. (11)

Lee and his men were now in a crucial situation. They were about seventeen miles from New Bridge, where he believed was his nearest support, and most of the cartridges were useless as they had gotten wet in the attack. The British would surely be sending out a party to track down Lee’s force, and van Buskirk’s men were lurking in the neighborhood. Lee began a quick march towards New Bridge with bayonets at the ready in case of attack.

Once Lee reached the Hackensack Road, he divided his force. Major Clark and his prisoners set off on the road by way of Three Pigeons and the English Neighborhood; Lee took the former center column down the same road; Captain Handy took the road near the river, now known as Bull’s Ferry Road. As they prepared to set off, about fifty soldiers, the lost men of Lee’s force, under Captain Calett of the Second Virginia Regiment, appeared from the woods. These men, with dry powder and good ammunition, were split amongst the three columns. As they came upon the Fort Lee road, near present-day Leonia, they met with Colonel Ball in command of two hundred men, set by Lord Stirling to support Lee’s retreat. Ball and his fresh men immediately moved to the rear. Unknown to the Americans, Lieutenant-Colonel Cosmo Gordon had been sent with about 200 men to reinforce the Paulus Hook fort, and Major Sutherland had been sent in pursuit of Lee with two light infantry companies of the guard under Captains Dundass and Maynard, probably numbering near 200 men. Ball came into contact with Sutherland’s men. At nearly the same time, about noon, van Buskirk’s men came into view of Lee’s retreating columns and opened fire. Lee ordered Lieutenant Reed to face them, while Lieutenant Rudolph with a small party entered a stone house and commenced firing. This gave Lee’s weary men time to retreat across the creek at Liberty Pole. Colonel Ball, now hearing firing in his rear at Lee’s location, doubled back so as not to be surrounded by the British forces. At Ball’s appearance, van Buskirk broke off his attack and retreated towards Paulus Hook. (12)

General Pattison reported that van Buskirk lost one man, and returned with four prisoners. Major Sutherland brought seven prisoners, including Captain Neals of Virginia, back to Paulus Hook with him. The Americans had two killed and three wounded, including Ezekiel Clark, who had his nose shot off. Lee arrived at New Bridge near one in the afternoon, with all of his prisoners.* (13)

On 24 September 1779, Congress issued a resolution, which read:

“Resolved, That the thanks of Congress be given to His Excellency General Washington for ordering with so much wisdom, the late’ attack on the enemy’s fort and work at Powles Hook.

Resolved, That the thanks of Congress be given to Major General Lord Stirling for the judicious. measures taken by him to forward the enterprise and to secure the retreat of the party.

Resolved, That the thanks of Congress be given to Major Lee for the remarkable prudence, address and bravery displayed by him on the occasion; and that they approve the humanity shown in circumstances prompting to severity as honorable to the arms of the United States, and correspondent to the noble principles on which they were assumed.

Resolved, That Congress entertain a high sense of the discipline, fortitude, and spirit manifested by the officers and soldiers under the command of Major Lee in the march, action and retreat, and while with singular satisfaction they acknowledge the merit of these gallant Men, they feel an additional pleasure of considering them a part of an army in which very many brave officers and soldiers have proved, by their cheerful performance of every duty under every difficulty, that they ardently wish to give the truly glorious examples they now receive.

Resolved, That Congress justly appreciates the military caution so happily combined with daring activity by Lieuts. McCallister and Rudolph in leading on the forlorn hope.

Resolved, That a medal of gold emblematical of this affair be struck, under the direction of the Board of Treasury, and presented to Major Lee.

The gold medal struck in honor of Lee.

Resolved, That the brevet and the pay and subsistence of Captain be given to Lieuts. McCallister and Rudolph respectively.” (14)

Notes:

(1) Memorial of the Centennial Celebration of the Battle of Paulus Hook August 19^th, 1879; With a History of the Early Settlement and Present Condition of Jersey City, N.J. Edited by George H. Farrier. M. Mullone Printer, Jersey City, NJ, 1879, p. 34.

(2) Ibid, p. 64.

(3) Bergen Summer 1779 - The Enterprise Against Paulus Hook. by Craig Mitchell. Bergen County Historical Society, 1979, p. 30.

(4) Collections of the New York Historical Society for the Year 1875. New York: Printed for the Society, 1876. “Official Letter of Major General James Pattison,” p. 101.

(5) Memorial of the Centennial Celebration of the Battle of Paulus Hook, p. 36; and Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal. Capt. Johann Ewald, Trans. & ed. Joseph P. Trustin, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1979, p. 175.

* A forlorn, or forlorn hope, is a group of soldiers who lead an assault on a military position.

(6) Washington and 'The Enterprise Against Powles Hook’: A New Study of the Surprise and Capture of the Fort Thursday, August 19, 1779 by William H. Richardson. The New Jersey Title Guarentee and Trust Company, Jersey City, NJ 1930, p. 15.

(7) Memorial of the Centennial Celebration of the Battle of Paulus Hook, p. 64-5; 44.

(8) Ibid, p. 45-6.

(9) Bergen Summer, p. 35; and Memorial of the Centennial Celebration of the Battle of Paulus Hook, p. 37, 46.

(10) Collections of the New York Historical Society, p. 101.

(11) Bergen Summer, p. 33, 39; and Collections of the New York Historical Society, p. 101.

(12) Bergen Summer, p. 37; and Memorial of the Centennial Celebration of the Battle of Paulus Hook, p. 51.

(13) Memorial of the Centennial Celebration of the Battle of Paulus Hook, p. 61, 63, 53, 51.

* Lee’s prisoners included the following: Six sergeants and sixty-seven rank and file of the garrison; one captain of the Sixty-fourth Regiment; one sergeant and ten rank and file of the Hessians; one surgeon, one surgeon’s mate, one quartermaster, four subalterns, two sergeants and thirty-nine rank and file of van Buskirk’s Regiment; two artificers; one sergeant, one corporal, two gunners and nine matrosses; and ten inhabitants; 158 total prisoners. On the following day, they were sent to Philadelphia. - Memorial of the Centennial Celebration of the Battle of Paulus Hook, p. 53.

(14) Memorial of the Centennial Celebration of the Battle of Paulus Hook, p. 81.

Massacre at Old Tappan

Colonel George Baylor, a native of Virginia who had short military service as an aide to General George Washington, was twenty-six years old in the summer of 1778. He commanded a regiment of dragoons* alternately known as the Third Continental Dragoons, the Third Light Dragoons or Lady Washington’s Guards. Baylor’s lightly armed regiment carried out few patrols; their duties consisted mostly of reconnaissance and escort, and they were accordingly lightly armed with sabers and some few pistols. (1) The major distinction in his career thus far was when he was awarded the privilege of delivering the news of Washington’s victory at Trenton and the captured Hessian flag to the Continental Congress in Baltimore. (2)

On 22 September 1778, the British sent a foraging expedition of about five thousand men from New York to the area between the Hackensack River and the Hudson River, where it was felt they would be best defended from an American attack. Five days later, Baylor’s regiment, which consisted of about 120 officers and men, was ordered to take a position between the main American army and the British foraging parties. With Major Alexander Clough, an experienced soldier and horseman, as second in command, the regiment moved to Harrington, New Jersey. Baylor and Clough made their headquarters at the house of Cornelius Haring, a known Tory. His officers boarded at four nearby houses, while his men stayed in six other out-buildings along the road. To the east, Baylor posted a guard at the bridge over the Hackensack River and sent out small patrols. (3)

General Charles Grey, in command of one of the British foraging parties, learned of Baylor’s position and prepared to move on the regiment. General Grey had earned a fierce reputation for taking no prisoners in a massacre of American troops at Paoli in Pennsylvania a year earlier. Among his tactics was the removal of the flint from the weapons of his soldiers to prevent any accidental discharge and preserve the secrecy of his attack. This forced his men to rely on close-quarters fighting and their bayonets. Since an attack from the west was most unlikely, Grey proceeded up the Kinderkamack Road to attack from that direction. Under Grey’s command were the Second Battalion of Light Infantry, the second Battalion of the Grenadiers, the 33^rd and 64^th Regiments of Foot, and a small detachment of cavalry. Grey ordered his Light Infantry to attack from two directions.

Major John Maitland with six companies advanced along the road to the patrol stationed at the bridge. Major Turner Straubenzee was led by Tory guides from the west to Baylor’s location. Between one and two o’clock in the morning of 28 September, the attack began. The sleeping Americans were completely surprised. Some of Baylor’s dragoons attempted to defend themselves with pistols or sabers, while others tried to hide under the hay in the barns. The British soldiers used their bayonets effectively, and also used their muskets as clubs to beat some of the American soldiers. (4) When Baylor and Clough heard the noise, they attempted to hide from the British by climbing into the chimney of the house where they were quartered. Both men were bayoneted multiple times by the British. (5)

Of the 120 Americans, the British killed eleven on the spot, while taking thirty-nine prisoners, eight of whom were wounded. The British left behind seventeen wounded Americans, four of whom later died. Only thirty-seven Americans escaped unharmed. Some of the Americans, were run through with bayonets a dozen times or more. Pvt. Julian King was reported to have been stabbed sixteen times, while two others received twelve wounds. Major Clough died of his wounds the following day, though Baylor lived on for two more years. (6) The British only lost one man, who was shot by an American dragoon. (7)

The British retreated to Tappan with their prisoners and supplies, and the Bergen County militia was sent out to locate survivors. The militia found six men killed at the bridge and others near the barns, but fearing a return of the British troops, they hastily buried the men in three abandoned leather tanning vats near the site of the massacre by the Hackensack River. (8)

In the spring of 1967, Thomas Demarest of Old Tappan claimed to know the location of the American burials, and feared that new development would destroy the site permanently. By summer of that year, the remains of six men were found buried in tanning vats in the area. (9) Today, the Baylor Massacre Park honors the American soldiers killed in this attack.

*Dragoons were mounted infantrymen, or lightly armed cavalrymen.

(1) The Massacre of Baylor’s Dragoons. By D. Bennett Mazur, Bergen Co. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 1968, p. 7.

(2) The Revolutionary War in Bergen County: The Times That Tried Men’s Souls. Edited by Carol Karels, The History Press, Charleston, SC, 2007, p. 118.

(3) Mazur, p. 7-8. Karels, p. 120.

(4) Mazur, p. 9.

(5) Karels, p. 120.

(6) Mazur, p. 9.

(7) Karels, p. 123.

(8) Karels, p. 123.

(9) Mazur, p. 19.